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Mr. Goble returns to the lists in an exchange with Father Kenealy
that has won high praise not only for its scholarly tone but also for
the mutual courtesy and respect which have been manifested.

THE DILEMMA OF THE NATURAL LAW
GEORGE

W.

GOBLE

I

F ATHER WILLIAM J. KENEALY, in his excellent article,

"Whose Natural
Law?" I asks, "whose natural law" I was criticising in my article
"Nature, Man and Law." 2 The answer is that the primary target of my
criticism was the natural law which developed in Europe in the 17th
and 18th centuries and was transported to the United States in the 18th
and 19th centuries. Dean Pound called this the "classical natural law,"
and as quoted in my previous article he defined it as follows:
According to the classical natural-law theory, all positive law, i.e., the
whole body of legal precepts that furnish the grounds of actual decision in
the courts, [is] but a more or less feeble reflection of an ideal body of
perfect rules, demonstrable by reason, and valid for all times, all places
and all men. 3
In the same article Dean Pound also said:
Positive legal precepts gottheir whole validity from their conformity to
these ideal rules [of natural law]. In other words, jurists and judges were
striving to make the grounds of decision conform to an ideal philosophical
pattern resting on reason and identical with an ideal moral pattern .... It

was less important to decide particular causes justly than to work out
4
sound, logically consistent and abstractly just rules for the future.
"Thus the natural-law theory," he said, "was kept alive in America
long after it had ceased to be a living theory in the Old World. .

. ."

5

These natural-law ideas were carried forward in America by what Dean
Pound called the "historico-analytical" theory which after performing a
certain usefulness in giving our law stability, finally became "an obstacle
to growth, a check on all conscious improvement of law, at the end of
the century."' 6 Of the lawyer of this period Pound said:
It was the confident belief of the historico-analytical common-law lawyer
that he could solve any problem whatsoever on the basis of the seventeenthcentury... Year Books. New forms of doing business, new agencies of
menace to the general security, new forms and purposes of association,
new conceptions of human relations and new social habits were quite.immaterial. Here were the absolute universal ... conceptions .... It was the

office of the judge to fit the case to the conception after the manner of
Procrustes. 7
1 KENEALY, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 259 (Oct. 1955).
2 GOBLE, Nature, Man and Law, 41 A.B.A.J. 403 (1955).
3 POUND, The Theory of Judicial Decisions, 36 HARv. L. REV. 802 (1923).
4 Id. at 802-03.
5 Id. at 804.
6 id. at 807.
71d. at 817.
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This view explains why, says Pound,
"... American state courts from 1890 to
1910 were so confidently dogmatic in holding modern social legislation to be unconstitutional."' 8 This theory of law and
attitude of the courts is attributable to the
natural law by Pound in the opening sentence of his article: "All nineteenth-century
theories of judicial decision in one way or.
another grow out of the natural-law thinking of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries." 9
It was this conception of natural law to
which I took exception, and I am glad that
Father Kenealy seems to be in accord with
my objections, or at least concedes that my
arguments have "considerable relevance to
the 'natural law' theories of Pufendorf,
Thomasius, Hobbes, Spinoza and their followers of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries." 10
II
But, says Father Kenealy, the natural law
described by Dean Pound is not the natural
law. It is spurious. Father Kenealy then sets
forth a conception of natural law which
differs in important respects from that described by Dean Pound. The seventeenth
and eighteenth century philosophers named
above are the "express adversaries" of the
classical natural law, says Father Kenealy.
He criticises them for extending the immutability idea to so large an area of the
law. Their system purported "to regulate
and to crystallize all legal institutions down
8 Id. at 822. On natural law theories that influenced early American thinking, see LE BOUTIL-

to incredible details." In contrast, Father
Kenealy's natural law envisages many "derivative principles" which do not have this
attribute, but which are only probably or
possibly true, and in these derivatives are
found the elements of "growth, change and
improvement" " in the law.
This divergence of opinion raises the
question as to who is to say what is the natural law. Who is to say what is the classical
natural law? The people who write classics
don't call them classics. Things come to be
what people call them, and sometimes the
same name is applied to two or more things.
In England "wheat" is called "corn." In
America "maize" is called "corn." I see no
point in trying to show that "corn" is really
"wheat" and not "maize." A number of
different systems of law have been called
"natural law." 12 1 don't know upon what
basis it can be claimed that one system is
more entitled to that designation than another. Anyway, the matter of labeling seems
relatively unimportant. And in any event, if
natural-law-type-A is criticised, it can hardly
be contended that the criticism is unsound
because it does not apply to natural-lawtype-B. That, however, seems to be the
main theme of Father Kenealy's objections
to my article. I criticised the natural law
described by Dean Pound. Father Kenealy
described another system called natural law,
and then took great pains to show that my
criticism had no application to it, and
further that since it did not, it is obvious
that I do not understand his system.
But now that Father Kenealy has put his
system of natural law in issue, I hope it will

LIER, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND NATURAL LAW

(1950).
9 POUND, The Theory of Judicial Decisions, 36
HARV. L. REV. 802 (1923).
10 KENEALY, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 261 (Oct. 1955).

II Id. at 262.
12 See WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF
NATURAL LAW 327-47 (1931), where eight different interpretations of the word "natural" are
listed.
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not be inappropriate, in this article, to devote some attention to it. Father Kenealy's
system as well as the system described by
Pound, encompasses what are called "fundamental principles" which are said to be
"certain, immutable and universal," and
which are "antecedent, both in logic and
in nature, to the formation of civil societies." 13 To the extent that Father Kenealy's
system incorporates this view it seems to
me to be vulnerable to at least some of the
criticisms set forth in my article. I shall
attempt to show the bases for this opinion.
The title to Father Kenealy's article,
"Whose Natural Law?" points up the problem: when two or more groups of men of
equal sincerity and reasonableness claim
universality and immutability for certain
principles of law, and they are in disagreement as to what those principles are, by
what criterion is the choice to be made between them? Whose natural law is the natural law? Father Kenealy's answer to this
question is that the true natural law is that
which can be shown to be valid by "objective evidence." My critic says:
I infer that Professor Goble believes that
the epistemological basis of natural law
philosophy is: the criterion of truth is subjective certitude or sincerity of subjective
conviction. This is simply not true.... [N]atural law philosophers unanimously set up
objective evidence as the criterion of
truth. 14
These positive assertions by Father
Kenealy that immutable and universal principles of natural law are established by
"objective evidence" are mystifying. I know
of no scientific means, or trial and error
procedures by which principles of law can
13 KENEALY, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 260 (Oct. 1955).
14 Id. at 264.

be determined to be immutable and universal. How can it be established by objective evidence that principles are good or
bad for society if we must accept them as
immutably created before there was any
society? Before society was formed there
could have been no objective evidence as
to the principles by which members of
• society were or should be controlled; nor
could the mind have discovered, by logic
or otherwise, principles which should be
applied to facts then unknown. And after
society was formed how could it then be
determined that these principles were valid
before society was formed? Furthermore,
what would be the purpose in testing by
objective evidence principles which are assumed to be universal and immutable before
they are tested? By hypothesis, such principles are not subject to limitation or change
even if experience showed that they should
be limited or changed.
We can test a legal principle to determine whether it is presently good or bad.
But there is no way of testing it to determine whether it was good or bad in the
remote past before there was any society.
Assuming that a principle has always been
good and always will -be good, how can
that fact be proved presently by "objective
evidence"? The only basis for a belief in
the validity of a principle before or after
the date of its verification by evidence is
probability. If the principle is valid today it
was probably valid yesterday, and will probably be valid tomorrow. However, as the
period of time before or after the date of
verification is lengthened, the probability
of the validity of the rule gradually decreases to a point where it vanishes. To
the extent that we project a principle forward or backward beyond this point of
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time, we rely solely on faith, and not on
objective evidence. If it be objected that
even science has no better method for determining principles than by use of objective evidence, the answer is, of course not,
but science limits itself to stating its laws
as probabilities or plausibilities, and not as
absolutes, universals or immutables. If it
be objected that legal empiricists have no
better basis for their conclusions, the answer again is, of course not, but they do
not claim that their generalizations are universal or immutable. Formerly science
stated its conclusions, or at least some of
them, in the form of absolutes. But so
many of these have been proved fallacious
that now science satisfies itself with more
15
cautious statements.
III
The proposition that certain legal principles are "antecedent, both in logic and in
nature, to the formation of civil societies"
seems to assume that the mind can reason
without experienc6-that it can by deductive logic reach conclusions about how
men ought to conduct themselves in society,
before society exists, and therefore before
there are facts upon which reasoning can
be based. Psychologists, I believe, would
deny this. The mind cannot create knowledge. It cannot think in a vacuum. It can
no more reason without facts than a mill
can grind without grist.
Father Kenealy's primary principle is,
"What is good, is to be done and what is
15 See REICHENBACH,

THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC

PHILOSOPHY (1951), especially Chapter 10 on the
relativity of scientific knowledge and the theory
of probabilities. This book shows the impact of
modern science upon philosophy, a fact which, it
seems to me, is largely ignored by advocates of
natural law.

evil is to be avoided .... ,, 16 But this statement could have no meaning to the mind
of a person who had had no social experience. A blank mind could not visualize
a situation to which the principle applied.
The principle could not be established by
logic or by nature until experience gave
the mind the stuff by which it could be
determined what sort of acts were good
acts and what sort were bad. If we define
"good" in general terms, that is, without
reference to particular acts, we would have
to say something like this, "good is what
one ought to do." But if we do that, the
principle becomes tautological, i.e., "one
ought to do what one ought to do." This
can hardly be said to be a principle at all.
Our knowledge of primitive languages
indicates that man first thought in terms of
specific things, and not in abstract or general terms. He had a word for a particular
tree or spear before he had a word for trees
or spears in general. 17 Likewise he thought
in terms of specific acts before he began to
put acts into classes or groups. It seems
probable that primitive man very early
learned by trial and error what specific acts
promoted his well being, and what acts injured it. After he acquired the power of
abstraction and generalization he put into
one category the acts that promoted his
well being and called them "good," and
into another category, the acts that harmed
him and called them "evil." Not until then
was it meaningful to say "do what is good;
avoid what is evil."
16 KENEALY, Whose Natural Law?, I CATHOLIC

LAWYER 259, 262 (Oct. 1955). As to the tautology or "emptiness" of such statements, see REICHENBACH, supra note 15.
17 FULLER, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 877,
889-90 (1931 ).
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IV
According to Father Kenealy, the principles expressed in the Decalogue have the
qualities of "certainty, universality and immutability." Suppose we consider the Commandment "Thou shalt not kill." Notwithstanding the literally clear, unqualified and
unconditional statement of this injunction,
one may justifiably kill another in self defense, in defense of his family, or even in
defense of a stranger. A sheriff may legally
execute one sentenced to death for the commission of a crime, and a policeman may kill
an escaping felon. A soldier in the armed
forces of his country may kill as many of
the enemy as he can. The larger the number he kills the greater hero he is. These
are generally recognized exceptions to the
mandate "Thou shalt not kill." But these
exceptions are in no sense "derived" from
the rule, as Father Kenealy seems to suggest. An exception which permits killing
cannot be "derived" from a rule which says
the exact opposite. Rather these exceptions
come from something outside the rule. They
come from other rules of policy, justice or
expediency. If that is true then the question
immediately arises, if these exceptions are
permissible, may not other exceptions also
be permissible. The principle itself is completely silent on how exceptions shall be
determined. Must not other exceptions depend upon experience and new ideas as to
policy, justice or expediency?
Suppose our country declares an unjust
war (as many thought the Mexican war to
be) and a volunteer in the army kills as
many of the enemy as he can, has he
violated the mandate against killing? What
about a soldier on the other side killing as
many of our men as he can? Has he violated
the injunction? Then there is the question
as to whether there was a war at all. Our

pioneers fought the Indians in many undeclared wars. We were frequently the aggressors, the Indians the defenders. At any
rate we now have the territory the Indians
had, and they have little or nothing in its
place. Were the pioneers justified under the
biblical injunction in killing Indians? When
the Japs attacked Pearl Harbor, war had
not been officially declared. Were our men
justified in shooting down the attackers?
They could have deserted their posts and
saved themselves. Were we justified in
dropping the A-bomb on Hiroshima, killing and maiming thousands of non-fighting
men, women anf children?
We start with the mandate "Thou shalt
not kill," and we wind up killing men,
women and children right and left by the
tens of thousands. If we justify all these
killings, we have made exception after exception to the principle. How do we know
that we have not made too many exceptions
or that we have not made enough? The rule
itself does not help us. Only experience,
and considerations outside the rule can furnish the answer to these questions. If we
are justified in killing a Russian spy for
performing what he conceives to be his
patriotic duty, why are we not justified in
taking the life of a person who wants to
die because of an incurable illness or of
taking the life of an unborn infant to save
8
the life of its mother?'
Primitive man had no compunction about
taking human life. He killed those he loved
-his wife, children or slaves-as sacrifices
at seedtime or on festive occasions. 19 It
18 See, on this problem, REPOUILLE V. UNITED
STATES, 165 F. 2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947) and the discussion of this and other cases in CAHN, THE
MORAL DECISION 300 (1955).
19WELLS,

(1921).

THE

OUTLINE

OF HISTORY

104-05

0
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was not self-evident to him that he should
not kill. In the seventeenth century hanging was the penalty for robbery. Such a
severe penalty is not now permissible. The
hangman in the seventeenth century was not
guilty of a crime for hanging a convicted
robber. The hanging was an exception to
the rule against killing. At the present time
he would be guilty of a crime. The rule
to not kill has been expanded to cover a
situation not covered before. Then is the
rule against killing universal as to time, as
to place or as to situation? Is it immutable
or does it change? If it changes, then are
not the boundaries of the rule itself shifted
by these variations in time, place or situation? If it be said that the principle "Thou
shalt not kill" simply prohibits killing under
ordinary circumstances, the question still
remains by what standard is it to be determined that the circumstances are ordinary. The question is always present,
does the particular case come under the
general rule or should it be made an exception. The rule furnishes no standard for
answering this question.
This is not to say that "Thou shalt not
kill" is not a good general rule, or that it
is not invaluable as a starting point in solving a problem involving a killing, or that
it does not establish a probability. It is to
say, that the statement is like any other
general rule, in that the type and number of
exceptions to it must be worked out by
considerations outside the rule and that
when they are worked out the rule itself is
changed. It is a general rule that a promise
to be binding must have consideration. But
experience has shown the desirability of a
number of exceptions. These exceptions are
not derived from the rule but from other

231
factors. As a result of the exceptions the
rule is modified.
So while the desirability of general rules
is not here controverted, it is asserted that
the framing of general rules that are universal and immutable and to which no exceptions are to be made is impossible. Certainly as a matter of semantics it cannot be
contended that a rule to which an exception
is made is not changed. Make enough exceptions to a rule and the rule disappears.
This has frequently happened in the history
of our law, e.g., the rule that a person who
is not a party to a contract cannot sue upon
it, and the rule that impossibility is no
excuse for the non-performance of a contractual promise.
V
Father Kenealy's anticipatory answer to
this argument is that:
It is a commonplace in classical natural
law philosophy that human rights, even the
most fundamental... are limited. They are
limited in the sense that they are subject
to specification, qualification, expansion
and contraction, and even forfeiture of
exercise .... 20
But this argument is completely unsatisfactory. It is simply linguistic gymnastics
to say in one breath that a principle is "certain, universal and immutable" or that a
right is "absolute," and in the next that it
is, nevertheless, subject to "qualification,"
"expansion," "contraction" or "forfeiture."
"Qualification" and "contraction" include
"exception," and an "exception" is an
actual
subtraction from the rule. Each exception
reduces the scope of the rule by the amount
of the exception, and therefore makes it apply to fewer situations. By any reasonable
definition this is a change in the rule itself.
Whose Natural Law?, I
259, 263-64 (Oct. 1955).

20 KENEALY,
LAWYER

CATHOLIC

,
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As I have tried to show, it is the qualifications, contractions, expansions and exceptions that determine the boundary lines of a
rule and therefore determine the full scope
and meaning of the rule itself. It seems to
me that Father Kenealy has paid a terrific
price in semantics to make it possible to say
that his fundamental principles are "certain,
universal and immutable."
o VI
Father Kenealy objects to my argument
that the inconsistencies between natural
law systems make it impossible to make
a reasonable choice between them. He
states that my argument proves too much,
that "its probative value, if any, militates
against any and all philosophies." This
point however is not well taken. My argument is based on the premise that the
qualities of "universality" and "immutability" of rules cannot be proved by objective
evidence. The existence of these properties
can be based only upon faith. This is not
the situation with respect to philosophies
not claiming these infallible attributes. This
issue is pointed up by Father Kenealy's assertion that all true "natural law philosophers agree on the fundamental principles
of the natural law .... ,,21 What this means
is that only those philosophers who agree
with Father Kenealy are true natural-law
lawyers. The philosophies of all others are
spurious. Advocates of the seventeenthcentury natural law made the same claim to
authenticity. So we have two claimants to
a universal and immutable set of principles. Which is true? Neither can be
proved by objective evidence, and their inconsistencies militate against either of them
21 Id. at 265.

being accepted on faith. To an objective
observer there would be no more reason for
accepting one system than the other. The
universality and immutability of principles
of law can either be determined by objective evidence or they cannot. If they can
be so determined, the whole body of natural law becomes a system of empirical
law. If they cannot be so determined, then
objective evidence cannot be used to show
the validity of one system over another
claiming the same attributes. This is the
dilemma of the natural law.
VII
Father Kenealy also takes exception to
my statement that the natural law is assumed to have "attained perfection." 2 2 But
to say that certain principles are "universal
and immutable," as Father Kenealy does,
with his fundamentals, is to say, it seems
to me, that those principles do not need
-changing and that they are therefore perfect.
I am asked by Father Kenealy to name
a "representative natural law philosopher...
[who] held to the principle that 'by natural
law, freedom of contract could not be interfered with by legislation'? ' 2 3 This is a
loaded question, because if I na~ie such a
person, all Father Kenealy need do is to
say that my selection is not a "representative natural-law philosopher" and he will
not be representative because he takes that
view. There were certainly a number of
judges who claimed to be natural-law
lawyers who held to the theory of th'e inviolability of freedom of contract. Justices
22

Ibid.

23 Id.at 263.
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Chase, Field, Miller, and Brewer may be
mentioned as among those who at various
times took this view. 24 These judges were
representatives of the natural law of the
nineteenth century, if not of the natural law
of Father Kenealy.
Father Kenealy further questions, "what
principle held to be certain, universal and
immutable has been relinquished at any
time by devotees of the classical natural
law?" 25 This question is also impossible to
answer to Father Kenealy's satisfaction, because any person I might'name as having
relinquished a fundamental principle of
natural law would by such relinquishment
disqualify himself as a "devotee" of Father
Kenealy's classical natural law. If my answer to the first question is accepted, then
my answer to this inquiry would be that
there has been a recession from the principle of the inviolability of the freedom of
contract.
In relation to this question I would like
to propose the name of Judge Robert N.
Wilkin as one who meets all of Father
Kenealy's requirements for a classical
24 See e.g., Chase, J., in CALDER V. BULL, 3 Dall.

386, 388 (U.S.

1798); Field, J., in BUTCHERS'

UNION V. CRESCENT, 111 U.S. 746, 756 (1884).
Other cases such as ADAIR V. UNITED STATES, 208
U.S. 161 (1908); COPPAGE v. KANSAS, 236 U.S.

1 (1914), are illustrative of the type of argument
used by the courts in reading into the Constitution
the "freedom of contract" idea, which it would
seem is based on the theory that the Constitution
incorporated by implication the natural law concepts of the eighteenth century. In support of
this interpretation of the cases, see HAINES, THE
REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 210-32
(1930), and also REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE
23-28 (1951).

natural-law lawyer. He has been classified
as a neo-scholastic and has written extensively upon the subject. 26 In 1952, Judge
Wilkin wrote a judicial opinion in which
he stated that since it is contrary to nature
for black birds, white birds, red birds and
blue birds to roost on the same limb of a
tree, it is contrary to natural law for colored persons to have a right to the use
of a public golf course which by city
ordinance was limited to white persons. "It
seems" said the judge, "that segregation is
not only recognized in constitutional law
and judicial decision, but that it is also
supported by general principles of natural
law." '27 Now, according to Father Kenealy,
"natural law philosophers agree on the
fundamental principles of natural law."
Since, then, it may be assumed that Judge
Wilkin and Father Kenealy are in accord
on those principles, it is pertinent to ask
(1) What fundamental principle of natural
law supports segregation and (2) what is
the "objective evidence" that proves this
principle. The United States Supreme Court,
unhampered by the natural law concepts of
Judge Wilkin, has now unanimously held
an ordinance invalid, which denied colored
28
persons the use of a public golf course.
If a segregation case now comes before
Judge Wilkin, will he hold the Supreme
Court's decision a nullity, because it violates
the immutable natural law which is paramount to the Constitution, or will he wave
a magical wand and hold that the changeless law has changed?
26 See REUSCHLEIN,

JURISPRUDENCE 391 (1951),

where Judge Wilkin is listed as a neo-scholastic.
27 HAYES v. CRUTCHER, 108 F. Supp. 582, 585

(M. D. Tenn. 1952).

25 KENEALY, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC

28HOLMES v. ATLANTA,

LAWYER 259, 262 (Oct. 1955).

(per curiam).

350 U.S.

879 (1955)
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I did list Judge Wilkin under the neoscholastics in my book. I did this before
Hayes v. Crutcher came down. I see inconsistencies in Judge Wilkin's opinion
in the Hayes case. For example, at one
point he says, "It seems that segregation
is not only recognized in constitutional
law and judicial decision, but that it is
also supported by general principles of
natural law." Later in the same opinion,
he says, "This Court therefore concludes
that segregation itself (where legal rights
are unaffected) is not unconstitutional or
unlawful; that it is a natural tendency
which in the progress of man's political,
social and spiritual evolution may change
or disappear." Well, what does he really
mean? Does he mean that segregation
is - something "supported by general
principles of natural law" or merely that
segregation is "a natural tendencywhich - may change or disappear"?
It may be that even a neo-scholastic
may err and fall from grace. Or maybe, I
was wrong. Maybe Judge Wilkin was and
is not a neo-scholastic-but something
more akin to the "state of Nature" kind
of natural law man.

Basic to much that has been advanced
in this discussion is the view that a rule
has no objective existence in any other
form than as a group of spoken or written
words, that is, as a symbol. The idea or
judgment which the words symbolize is the
important thing, and it has no existence except in the mind. The rule is therefore
subjective and not objective. 29 The idea
forming the rule may be conceived as the
result of one's actual observation of facts or
of hearing the facts related by others, or
it may be conceived by one's hearing or
reading it after it has been arranged into
the form of words by someone else. In the
former case the stimuius for the idea has
been the facts concerning which the rule
is made. In the latter the stimulus has been
the spoken or written group of words, which
symbolize the rule. In either case the rule
is subjective. Of course, conduct which results from knowledge of the rule is objective, but conduct in compliance with a rule,
can hardly be said to be the rule itself.
It seems probable that the mind would
not have the power to make a perfect
formulation of a rule upon the basis of a
29

One cannot be certain that even as to physical

laws, one's mental image corresponds to reality.
Even I am capable of making a mistake but I do not think I did when I
wrote in 1951 -and
that is when I
wrote. I do not, however, believe that
Judge Wilkin can qualify as a neoscholastic if he really means everything
he wrote in Hayes v. Crutcher.
Harold G. Reuschlein

"Our scientific laws are always a posteriori, and
governed by the facts to which they must submit.... They are therefore essentially relative and
subjective, and their validity is strictly limited to
man and depends on the identity of the other in-

dividuals' to the same external stimuli.... It is
clear therefore that expressions such as 'scientific

truth' should only be taken in a very limited sense
and not literally .... There is no scientific truth in
the absolute sense .... We know less about our
material world than is generally believed, and that
our knowledge is subjective, and conditioned by

the structure of our brain."
HUMAN DESTINY

LECOMTE DU NouY,

15, 38 (New York 1947).
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first experience with a particular group of
facts. The first attempt would be more like
a trial run. The rule may turn out to be
good or bad. However, even if the rule
turned out to be good, it is likely that it
would need modification, revision or restatement as the result of the impact upon
the mind of new situations, or as the result
of new knowledge or insights. In the course
of hundreds of years it seems probable that
a rule would be changed, modified or
restated many times, or even completely
abandoned. This is the method of growththe process of evolution. In the early
history of man, rules no doubt were arbitrary, unreasonable, and even immoral, at
least according to modern standards. With
the development of memory, knowledge
increased and experience in applying rules
gradually stimulated the development of
ideas of policy, justice and morality. Conscience was born, and the element of
"ought" was introduced into rule making.
But the "ought" would have no meaning
unassociated with acts, to which it could
be made to apply. However, as man
acquired wisdom he became able to integrate the acts and the "ought" into the
form of a rule. As he continued to mature
and to acquire greater stature through increased knowledge, the more able he became to make long range plans, to select
more distant goals and to devise more
adequate rules for attaining them.3 0 It
appears that Father Kenealy believes that
fundamental principles should not yield to
man's broader knowledge or deeper insights, because he is sure that the fundamental principles man now has are "certain,
universal and immutable" and therefore
30 See

(1955).

CAHN,

THE

MORAL

DECISION,

312-15

perfect, and incapable of improvement. 3 1
This proposition I find myself unable to
accept.
Father Kenealy asserts that "subjectivism
is sheer intellectual defeatism" and that no
philosophy based upon ideological "subjectivism" offers an "intellectually adequate
reply to the destructive philosophy of totalitarianism." The implication of this assertion
is that only natural law, i.e., only a philos31 DEAN MIRIAM THERESA ROONEY in an informative and scholarly article, Natural Law and Legal
Justice, 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 22 (Jan. 1956)
states that in my article, Nature, Man and Law,
41 A.B.A.J. 403 (1955), I was beating a "straw
man" of my own creation. But Miss Rooney can
hardly be unaware of the tremendous movement
in our law described by Dean Pound and quoted
near the beginning of this article. The impact of
this natural law philosophy, continued for three
centuries, was still very much in vogue in 1930
and even as late as 1952. William Gilligan in his
letter [41 A.B.A.J. 680 (1955)] seems to bring
the theory down to 1955. Note in his comment the
use of "certain absolutes" and the suggestion that
the best way to maintain the natural law doctrine
in all its pristine glory is to close the columns of
the press to those who criticize it. The phenomenon was and still is a very vigorous "straw man,"
and was of course quite beyond my power to
create. The fact that this is not the natural law of
Thomas Aquinas does not disprove the movement.
Miss Rooney further says that after pointing
out "the limits of human reason" I "lapsed into
a non sequitur by attributing absolutism to adherents of the natural law school." But Miss
Rooney has misunderstood my article. What I
said was (1) that experience shows that the mind
of man is limited in its ability to understand nature; (2) that because of this, in both the physical
and social sciences, we have frequently over-generalized and stated propositions to be absolute
and universal which were later found to be limited
or relative; (3) that the particular school of natural law which I described in the article had stated
its principles in absolute and universal form, and
(4) that this experience indicates that, in the law
as in the sciences, we should be more cautious in
our generalizations and avoid stating propositions
as absolutes or universals simply because we believe them to be true.

DILEMMA OF THE NATURAL LAW

ophy that accepts the attributes of certainty,
universality and immutability of its fundamental principles can provide an effective
rebuttal to totalitarianism. This position in
my judgment is indefensible. It ignores the
fact that men can believe and vigorously
uphold principles based upon the accumulated wisdom of the ages, and that they can
learn from experience what kind of a government is good and what kind is bad. It
ignores the fact that standards of reference
need not be eternally fixed. One of the most
important procedures in science is to conduct experiments upon the basis of unproved postulates and to judge its results
with reference to unproved values. Though
the pole star moves, it is a reliable guide to
the mariner. Though a raft is drifting it can
be the means of saving the life of a drowning
man. The strongest opposition to totalitarianism is found not in natural law, but in the
accumulated wisdom of mankind.
Ix
At this juncture I would like to point out
with emphasis, that because I reject the natural law theory of Father Kenealy, I am not
asserting that there are no basic principles
of enduring quality in our law. On the contrary, it is my belief that our composite
wisdom has created a strong probability in

favor of the great worth of many principles,
and these we should uphold and defend, and
should use as criteria for the determination
of good and bad, until experience convinces
us of the desirability of change. Differing
from Father Kenealy, I recognize that new
experience, new insights or new knowledge
may show the need for modification, of
these fundamental principles and when they
do, the indicated modifications should be
made. It is my belief that in the search for
truth the mind should not be shackled by
unverifiable rules.
In closing I wish to say that I appreciate
the fine spirit in which Father Kenealy has
set forth his criticisms of my article. The
whole tenor of his argument is such as to
indicate that he is a man of great sincerity
and goodwill, and that he is a seeker after
truth. Moreover, he is a master dialectician.
It is a pleasure to discuss these issues with
one so dispassionate, so reasonable and so
fair. In this article I have tried, I hope with
success, to maintain the high level of disputation that he has set.

[Father Kenealy and Dean Rooney have
expressed the intention of responding to Mr.
Goble's present article in a subsequent
issue. Ed.]

